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UNITED STATES V. IRVING
(decided September 15, 2003)
JARED SPITALNICK*
With the advanced storage capacities available on modern
computer hard drives, should a customs agent have the authority to
freely search a traveler’s computer files simply because the traveler
is crossing a border, or does this authority infringe on a traveler’s
right to privacy?  In United States v. Irving,1 the United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York held that a United
States customs agent can go as far as developing film and viewing
the contents of computer files when “reasonable suspicion”2 is pre-
sent.3  However, in dicta, the Irving court further opined that a cus-
toms agent may inspect the contents of computer files regardless of
whether “reasonable suspicion” is present or not.4  This is signifi-
cant because, according to the court, a customs agent can pull aside
a traveler with a computer and freely search each individual file on
the computer without any justification.  A customs agent could also
read sensitive personal information or confidential corporate or le-
gal documents simply because the computer passes through a bor-
der.  This case comment will argue that while the Irving holding was
correct, the court’s dicta could provide the basis for a troubling
expansion of the border-search doctrine.5  In doing so, this case
comment will first examine why the search of computer files should
be considered “non-routine,”6 and therefore requires a “reasonable
* J.D. Candidate, 2005, New York Law School.
1. 2003 WL 22127913 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
2. United States v. Rivas, 157 F.3d 364, 367 (5th Cir. 1998) (“‘Reasonable suspi-
cion is defined as ‘a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular per-
son’ of smuggling contraband.’”) (citation omitted).
3. Irving, 2003 WL 22127913, at *5.
4. Id.
5. The border-search doctrine states that searches conducted at international
borders do not require a warrant, probable cause, or any suspicion to justify the search,
as long as the search is “routine” – i.e. – it does not “seriously invade a traveler’s pri-
vacy.”  Rivas, 157 F.3d at 367 (5th Cir. 1993), citing United States v. Cardenas, 9 F.3d
1139, 1147 (5th Cir. 1993).
6. See discussion supra note 5.
425
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suspicion” standard.  This case comment will next analyze the prob-
lem of classifying a computer as a “closed container” for the pur-
poses of a Fourth Amendment search.  It will then examine the
holdings of United States v. Molina-Tarazon7 and United States v. Soto-
Teran8 to argue that without a “reasonable suspicion” standard, the
search of computer files could lead to psychological apprehension
and an impermissible invasion of privacy.
In 1982, Stefan Irving pled guilty to a charge of first degree
sexual assault.9  In 1996, the government initiated a nationwide in-
vestigation aimed at preventing suspected pedophiles from travel-
ing to Mexico to engage in sexual acts with children.10  Two years
later, Irving became a subject of the government’s nationwide
investigation.11
On May 27, 1998, Irving was traveling back to the United States
from Mexico when he was stopped and searched by customs agents
at the Dallas-Fort Worth Airport.12  No pornography or evidence of
a crime was found during the search.13  However, Irving was in pos-
session of children’s books and what appeared to be children’s
drawings.14  Customs agents then questioned Irving,15 and he ad-
mitted to being a convicted pedophile.16  The agents went through
Irving’s luggage and found children’s drawings, several children’s
books, a disposable camera, and two computer diskettes.17  The
agents developed the film and checked the content on the disket-
tes.18  Subsequently, the film proved to contain no pornography but
the diskettes revealed some evidence of child erotica.19
7. 279 F.3d. 709, 713 (9th Cir. 2000).
8. 44 F. Supp. 2d. 185 (E.D.N.Y. 1996).






15. Irving, 2003 WL 22127913, at *1.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. at *2.
19. Id.; see also United States v. Hudak, 2003 WL 22170606, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)
(defining “child erotica” as “images of nude children that do not rise to the level of
pornography”).
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Irving was later charged with traveling abroad with the intent
to have sex with children, and receipt and possession of child por-
nography.20  Irving moved to suppress the statements he made and
the evidence seized by the customs agents on May 27, 1998.21  Ir-
ving argued that the search was not “routine,”22 but was part of the
government’s investigation of travelers suspected of going to Mex-
ico to commit sexual acts on children.23
The district court denied the motion to suppress the evidence
seized on May 27, 1998.24  The court found that customs agents had
reasonable suspicion for their search and that the motive in initiat-
ing the search was immaterial in the border context.25  The court
stated that customs officials had a reasonable basis for suspecting
that Irving’s camera, film, and computer diskettes contained porno-
graphic images.26  First, the customs agents knew Irving was a con-
victed pedophile.27  Second, Irving was carrying children’s books
and drawings, and was returning from an orphanage in Mexico.28
Finally, Irving was a subject of the government’s ongoing investiga-
tion of individuals suspected of traveling to Mexico to engage in
sexual acts with children.29  Regardless of this finding, the court
stated in dictum that, “the agents were entitled to inspect the con-
tents of the [computer] diskettes even absent reasonable suspi-
cion.”30  The court based this statement on the notion that a
computer is a “closed container,”31 and therefore comes within the
scope of a routine border search.32
20. Irving, 2003 WL 22127913, at *1.
21. Id.  This case comment will only address the search and not the issue regard-
ing the statements Irving made to the customs agents.
22. See supra note 5.
23. Irving, 2003 WL 22127913, at *4.
24. Id. at *6.
25. Id. at *4-5.
26. Id. at *5.
27. Id.
28. Id. at *5.
29. Irving, 2003 WL 22127913, at *1.
30. Id. at *5.
31. See McCormick v. City of Lawrence, 289 F.Supp.2d 1264, 1266 (D. Kan. 2003)
(comparing a personal computer to a closed container under a Fourth Amendment
analysis).
32. Irving, 2003 WL 22127913, at *5.
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The court’s decision in Irving should be narrowly interpreted.
Construed broadly, this decision could be persuasive authority for
permitting the search of any traveler’s computer simply because the
traveler passes through customs.  The court’s statement that all
“closed containers” are subject to “routine” searches and do not re-
quire reasonable suspicion is problematic because it fails to con-
sider the nature of computer files.33  This rule would permit a
customs agent to search a traveler’s computer and diskettes without
reasonable suspicion merely because they are considered “closed
containers” for the purposes of a Fourth Amendment34 search.35
This case comment contends that to search a computer or com-
puter diskette, a customs official must first have reasonable suspi-
cion that the computer or computer diskette contains contraband.
In Irving, the court compared the search of a computer dis-
kette to the search of luggage.36  According to the court, both are
considered “closed containers” and therefore come within the
scope of a “routine” border search.37  This analysis is problematic
for two reasons. First, simply because luggage, computers, and dis-
33. See United States v. Molina-Tarazon, 279 F.3d. 709, 713 (9th Cir. 2000)
(“[S]ome searches of inanimate objects can be so intrusive as to be considered
nonroutine.”).
34. The Fourth Amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and
the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
35. See Irving, 2003 WL 22127913, at *5, citing United States v. Roberts, 86 F. Supp.
2d 678, 688-89 (S.D. Texas 2000).  In Roberts, the defendant was charged with possession
of child pornography based on evidence obtained during a warrantless border search.
Customs agents received a tip that Roberts would be traveling from Houston to Paris
and that he would be in possession of child pornography.  When Roberts arrived at the
airport, customs inspectors searched him.  The inspectors found six Zip computer disks
inside Roberts’ shaving kit, exactly where the informant said they would be located.
Agents then opened Robert’s laptop and told him that they needed to scan the material
on the disks.  The court found that a search of Roberts’s computer would not have been
“destructive or so personally invasive as to be non-routine.”  The court came to this
conclusion by “analogizing the Fourth Amendment protection afforded to an individ-
ual’s computer files and computer hard drive to the protection given an individual’s
closed containers and closed personal effects.”
36. See Irving, 2003 WL 22127913, at *5.
37. See id.
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kettes are considered “closed containers” does not automatically
mean that they should be subject to a “routine” border search.38  A
single disk may contain large amounts of information relating to
many different topics.39  A more appropriate analogy would com-
pare a computer disk or hard drive to an entire archive or record
center.40  Furthermore, this analogy “oversimplif[ies] a complex
area of Fourth Amendment doctrines and ignore[s] the realities of
massive modern computer storage.”41  Second, the court’s reason-
ing is problematic because the border-search doctrine turns on
whether the search is “routine” or “non-routine,” not whether the
object is a “closed container.”42
The border-search doctrine permits government agents to con-
duct a search at an international border without a warrant, proba-
ble cause, or any suspicion to justify the search, as long as the
search is “routine.”43  A “routine search” is a search that does not
“seriously invade a traveler’s privacy.”44  If a traveler’s privacy is seri-
ously invaded then the search is considered “non-routine” and rea-
sonable suspicion is required to perform the search.45  In United
States v. Kelly,46 the Fifth Circuit held “the key variable [for deter-
mining when a search is ‘routine’] is the invasion of the privacy and
dignity of the individual.”47
38. See Molina-Tarazon, 279 F.3d. at 713 (“[S]ome searches of inanimate objects
can be so intrusive as to be considered nonroutine.”).
39. Raphael Winick, Searches and Seizures of Computers and Computer Data, 8 HARV.
J.L. & TECH. 75, 86 (1994) (“Given the massive storage capacities of disks and other
modern storage media, a single disk may well contain information on a vast array of
topics.  For example, officers searching a computer for a telephone number may use
the opportunity to rummage through financial records, written correspondence, elec-
tronic mail, or other obviously personal and irrelevant records also contained on the
computer.”).
40. Id. at 82.
41. See United States v. Carey, 172 F.3d 1268, 1275 (10th Cir. 1999) (“‘Relying on
analogies to closed containers or file cabinets may lead courts to ‘oversimplify a com-
plex area of Fourth Amendment doctrines and ignore the realities of massive modern
computer storage.’”) (citation omitted).
42. See United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 538 (1985).
43. Rivas, 157 F.3d at 367.
44. Id., citing United States v. Cardenas, 9 F.3d 1139, 1147 (5th Cir. 1993).
45. See United States v. Robles, 45 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 1995); see also Rivas, 157 F.3d
at 367.
46. 302 F.3d. 291 (5th Cir. 2002).
47. Id. at 294.
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Similarly in United States v. Braks,48 the First Circuit held that
the degree of invasiveness or intrusiveness involved in the search
determines whether the search is “routine.”49  Thus, the main focus
of a “routine” search is the degree of intrusiveness involved, and
not whether the object searched is a “closed container.”50  Based on
the reasoning employed in Kelly and Braks, the Irving court’s analy-
sis that the customs agents could have searched Irving’s computer
diskettes without reasonable suspicion is troubling.51
The Irving court relied upon United States v. Roberts52 for the
proposition that the “inspection of the contents of closed contain-
ers comes within the scope of a routine border search and is per-
missible even in the absence of reasonable suspicion or probable
cause.”53  However, there are circumstances in which the search of
closed containers could be so intrusive as to be considered non-
routine.54
In United States v. Molina-Tarazon,55 the Ninth Circuit held that
customs agents’ removal, disassembly, and search of the fuel tank
on the defendant’s pickup truck was not a “routine” border search
and therefore required reasonable suspicion under the Fourth
Amendment.56  The Ninth Circuit further stated that it might be
difficult to determine when an inanimate object search becomes so
intrusive as to warrant reasonable suspicion.57  A search of an inani-
mate object does not subject a person to the same degree of indig-
nity as a search of the human body.58  However, it is important to
note that causing indignity is not the only way a search might be
48. 842 F.2d. 509 (1st Cir. 1988).
49. Id. at 511.
50. See id.; see also Kelly, 302 F.3d. at 294.
51. Compare Kelly, 302 F.3d. at 294 (explaining that the requirement of reasonable
suspicion in a border search depends on the degree of intrusion into the privacy and
dignity of the individual), and Braks, 842 F.2d. at 512 (stating that one of the factors for
determining the degree of intrusiveness involved in a search is “whether the suspect’s
reasonable expectations of privacy, if any, are abrogated by the search”).
52. 86 F. Supp. 2d 678 (S.D. Texas 2000).
53. Irving, 2003 WL 22127913, at *5, citing Roberts, 86 F. Supp. 2d at 688.
54. Molina-Tarazon, 279 F.3d. at 713 (“[S]ome searches of inanimate objects can
be so intrusive as to be considered nonroutine.”).
55. 279 F.3d. 709 (9th Cir. 2000).
56. Id. at  717.
57. Id. at 713.
58. Id.
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“non-routine.”  A search could be considered “non-routine” based
on the use of force, the risk of harm, and the diminished sense of
security that is involved in, or comes about as a result of, the
search.59
In Molina-Tarazon, the court considered whether the search of
the defendant’s fuel tank was psychologically intrusive when deter-
mining if the search was “non-routine.”60  The court stated that
“[p]eople’s minds are as vulnerable to intrusion as their physical
possessions.”61  As a result, fear is a significant factor that needs to
be addressed when evaluating the level of intrusiveness involved in
a search.62  The Molina-Tarazon court emphasized that “government
intrusions into the mind, specifically those that would cause fear or
apprehension in a reasonable person, are no less deserving of
Fourth Amendment scrutiny than intrusions that are physical in na-
ture.”63  The search of a traveler’s computer may cause fear or ap-
prehension because of the potentially large amount of personal
information that might be stored in it.64  Therefore, searching com-
puter files could be psychologically intrusive and contribute to a
traveler’s apprehension.
The Molina-Tarazon court specifically focused on how the
search of a fuel tank could contribute to a driver’s apprehension.65
The court’s analysis is useful for determining whether the search of
59. Id. (explaining that force, harm, and psychological effect of a search happen
to be factors relevant in this case, but not ruling out the fact that other factors may also
render a search non-routine).
60. Id. at 715.
61. Molina-Tarazon, 279 F.3d at 715.
62. Id. at 716 (“The imposition of fear is a type of psychological intrusion. The
Supreme Court has therefore recognized that the level of fear a particular search is
likely to engender is a significant factor in evaluating intrusiveness.”).
63. Id., citing United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 588 (holding that
fixed checkpoints are preferable to roving searches because “the subjective intrusion —
generating of concern or fright on the part of the lawful traveler — is appreciably
less. . ..”); cf. Craig M. Bradley, Constitutional Protection for Private Papers, 16 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REV. 461, 483 (1981) (“A search for private papers may be no more physically
intrusive than a search for a gun, but the psychological intrusion is far greater because
the searcher is invading not only the subject’s house but his or her thoughts as well.”).
64. See United States v. Walser, 275 F.3d. 981, 986 (10th Cir. 2001) (“Because com-
puters can hold so much information touching on many different areas of a person’s
life, there is a greater potential for the ‘intermingling’ of documents and a consequent
invasion of privacy when police execute a search for evidence on a computer.”).
65. Molina-Tarazon, 279 F.3d. at 716.
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a computer should require reasonable suspicion.  The court recog-
nized that a driver might not know if the government contractor is
licensed to perform the work involved — i.e, removing the fuel
tank to search for drugs and then reattaching it — or what stan-
dards the government used in selecting a contractor.66  Similarly, in
Irving, a traveler may be unaware of the customs agent’s computer
skill level, and/or the standards used in hiring him to perform the
search, thus contributing to a traveler’s apprehension.  Further-
more, one of the biggest threats to a computer is not a virus or a
worm, but rather an accident caused by an unskilled user.67
In addition, the Molina-Tarazon court noted that there is no
independent incentive for a government contractor to act with cau-
tion, skill, and precision.68  Instead, the main concern is to search
quickly and find contraband, and not necessarily to act with the
greatest of care.69  This is also analogous to Irving because customs
agents lack the incentive to take adequate precautions when work-
ing on a traveler’s computer files.  Their purpose is to find illicit
materials and not necessarily to act with the greatest of care when
dealing with a traveler’s computer diskette.
Finally, the Molina-Tarazon court addressed the complexity of a
search such as the one on Molina’s truck and stated that a driver
has no way of knowing whether the parts are restored to their origi-
nal state.70  Moreover, if no certified or licensed mechanic is pre-
sent, the driver has no way of confirming whether the fuel tank is
correctly reassembled.71  Similarly, in Irving, if no certified or li-
censed computer technician is present during the search of a trav-
eler’s computer, then the traveler has no way of verifying that the
66. Id.
67. See George V. Hulme, The Threat From Inside: The Biggest Danger to Computer
Systems Comes from Employees. New Products Address the Problem. (April 14, 2003), available at
InformationWeek, http://www.informationweek.com/story/showArticle.jhtml?article
ID=8900062 (last visited Sept. 9, 2004) (“‘Too much attention has been focused on the
outside threat,’ says Shannon Clyde, an information security officer for Travis County,
Texas. ‘I’m just as worried about ‘Joan’ in accounting making a naı¨ve mistake and trash-
ing financial spreadsheets or making information available where it shouldn’t be.’”).
68. Molina-Tarazon, 279 F.3d. at 716 (explaining why a driver might have reason to
doubt a mechanic’s incentive to take adequate precautions in dismantling and reassem-
bling portions of the vehicle).
69. Id.
70. Id. at 717.
71. Id.
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computer was returned to its original state, and that no files are
missing or damaged.  Therefore, the increased level of psychologi-
cal intrusiveness and apprehension involved in searching a trav-
eler’s computer files supports the need for a reasonable suspicion
requirement.
In addition to the psychological intrusion and apprehension
involved in searching a computer, the intrusion involved in a close
reading of computer files, absent reasonable suspicion, could also
violate a person’s privacy rights.72
In United States v. Soto-Teran,73 the court recommended the ap-
plication of a reasonable suspicion standard for determining the
lawfulness of a border officials’ actions when closely reading and
photocopying documents.74  The court stated that the perusal of
mail, letters, and documents falls within a routine border search,
yet a closer, more careful examination of those documents could
intrude on a person’s privacy because they may contain sensitive
personal information, such as a diary or desk calendar.75  Similarly,
in Irving, a close reading of computer files intrudes on a person’s
privacy because those files could deal with the same personal mat-
ters.  Computers often contain confidential information.76  Addi-
tionally, computers are now frequently used for business purposes
and often contain confidential corporate information.77  Further-
more, because privacy expectations “[relate] to the contents of [a]
container rather than to the container itself,”78 placing data in a
computer or on a diskette creates a reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy in the contents of that container.79  Additionally, because a
72. See United States v. Soto-Teran, 44 F. Supp. 2d. 185, 191 (E.D.N.Y. 1996).
73. 44 F. Supp. 2d. 185 (E.D.N.Y. 1996).
74. Id. at 191.
75. Id.
76. See Winick, supra note 39, at 81 (“[C]omputers are repositories of personal
information.”).
77. See Baer v. Reliant Energy Mid-Atlantic Power Holdings, 2002 WL 31189503, at
*5 (E.D. Pa. 2002) (“Many people in today’s workforce use computers for their
jobs. . .”); see also, e.g., Prowest Diversified, Inc. v. United States, 40 Fed.Cl. 879, 885.
(1998) (“[Attorney] entered the billing information directly onto a computer program,
which generates billing statements to clients.”).
78. United States v. Barth, 26 F. Supp. 2d 929, 936 (W.D. Tex 1998).
79. Id. at 936-37 (“By placing data in files in a storage device such as his hard
drive, the [c]ourt finds that Defendant manifested a reasonable expectation of privacy
in the contents of those files.”).
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computer can hold a large amount of personal information, there
is great potential for the invasion of privacy when the government
executes a search for evidence on a computer.80  Therefore, a rea-
sonable suspicion standard should be applied to computer searches
in the border context because of the increased potential for the
invasion of privacy.
The Irving court managed to avoid the issues raised in this case
comment by finding reasonable suspicion.81  Although a search
that is not “routine” requires a reasonable suspicion of wrongdo-
ing,82 determining whether a search is “routine” or “non-routine” is
irrelevant if reasonable suspicion is already present.83  A reasonable
suspicion of wrongdoing was present in Irving because Irving was
already the subject of a government investigation and was in posses-
sion of children’s books and drawings at the time the customs in-
spector initially searched his bags.84  Thus, in Irving, it did not
matter whether the search was “routine” or “non-routine” because
the reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing was already present.85
Irving should be narrowly construed to apply only to cases
where reasonable suspicion is present because of the fear and ap-
prehension a traveler may face when a customs agent searches a
computer.86  Furthermore, the reasonable suspicion standard nor-
mally applied to “non-routine” searches should be used in all bor-
der searches of computers because of the increased potential for an
invasion of privacy.87  Requiring the reasonable suspicion standard
will thus prevent Irving’s dicta from providing the basis for a troub-
ling expansion of the border-search doctrine.
80. Walser, 275 F.3d. at 986 (“Because computers can hold so much information
touching on many different areas of a person’s life, there is a greater potential for the
‘intermingling’ of documents and a consequent invasion of privacy when police exe-
cute a search for evidence on a computer.”).
81. See Irving, 2003 WL 22127913, at *5.
82. See Rivas, 157 F.3d at 367.
83. See Molina-Tarazon, 279 F.3d. at 717 (“That the search was not routine does not
necessarily render it unlawful. The search would still have been lawful if the officers
conducted it based on a reasonable suspicion that Molina might have been concealing
contraband.”).
84. Irving, 2003 WL 22127913, at *5.
85. Id.
86. See Molina-Tarazon, 279 F.3d. at 716-17.
87. See Walser, 275 F.3d. 986 (arguing that there is a potential invasion of privacy
involved in a computer search); see also Soto-Teran, 44 F. Supp. 2d. at 191.
